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RECENT DECISIONS
such extraordinary facts as would warrant that result. The courts,
however, have stated that being punished twice for the same offense
is contrary to the fundamental concepts of the Bill of Rights, even
though there is no technical bar to prosecution by both federal and
state courts for the same act. In two cases where there was a double
conviction in this manner the court either suspended sentence or im-
posed only a nominal penalty.11 It is evident, therefore, that when
the Court in Jerome v. United States, declined to construe a federal
criminal statute so as to include state felonies within its scope, and
gave as one of its reasons for so doing, the danger of double punish-
ment for the same offense, it was following the principles enunciated
in the aforementioned cases 12 which uphold the spirit of the consti-
tutional guaranty as to the prevention of double jeopardy.
L.Y.
FEDERAL EmPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT-MASTER AND SERVANT-
AssumI'ioN OF RISK.-Death action brought under Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act' by widow and administratrix of decedent, a
railroad policeman employed by respondent. The complaint alleged
negligence and failure to provide a reasonably safe place to work.
Decedent was standing between two narrowly separated tracks in the
respondent's unlighted switchyards on an exceedingly dark night, and
as he was using a flashlight to inspect the seals of a slowly moving
train, he was suddenly struck and killed by the rear car of a train
which was backing in the opposite direction on an adjoining track.
No warning by sound or light was conveyed to decedent.2 Motion
by defendant for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence
disclosed no actionable negligence-was granted. Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed,3 holding that decedent had assumed the risk of his
position and that therefore no duty was owing to him by respondent.
On certiorari before the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed
and remanded with directions. The 1939 amendment to the Federal
Employer's Act 4 obliterated every vestige of "assumption of risk"
11 United States v. Holt, 270 Fed. 639 (1921) ; cf. United States v. Palan,
cited supra note 10.
12 See note 10 supra.
145 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq. (1906), repassed with
alterations not material (1908), cited infra note 10.
2 Circuit Court found (128 F. [2d] 420, 422 [1942]) that it was "probable
that Tiller did not hear cars approaching" from behind him.
3 Id. at 420.
4 53 STAT. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 54 (1939), "... employees shall not be held
to have assumed the risks of employment in any case where such injury or
death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier." See note 13 infra for provision in § 54
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doctrine. No concept of such doctrine should be the basis for with-
holding from the jury any determination of questions of negligence.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 63 Sup. Ct. 444, 87 L. ed. 446
(1943).
Master-servant tort law adopted the judicially created doctrine
of "assumption of risk" over a century ago." A master was held
blameless in actions by employees (1) who have entered and remained
in hazardous occupations.6 (2) who accepted or continued employ-
ment with notice of negligence, 7 on the premise that the employee
assumed the risk. Cases applied the doctrine interchangeably as a
defense to the employer's actual negligence and as an equivalent to
non-negligence.8 From a question of fact on the general issue of
negligence to be determined by the jury, the defense of assumption of
risk evolved by gradual extension and amplification to a question
determined by the court as a matter of law.9 A purported modifica-
tion of the common law concept of negligence with its barriers against
employee recovery in industrial accident suits, while adopting the
general theory itself as a basis, was legislated in the Federal Employ-
er's Liability Act in 1906,10 covering interstate railroad employees.
Certain statutory safeguards were thrown around the plaintiff: Fellow-
servant rule was abolished ;"1 comparative negligence was substituted
prior to 1939 amendment relating to "risks of employment!', and which is still
retained in amended section.
'Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 6 (Ex. 1837) (reputedly the first case
creating this doctrine); see (1939) 53 HARv. L. REv. 341, in which the court
said, "The servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master,
and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he reasonably apprehends
injury to himself: and in most of the cases in which danger may be incurred,
if not in all, he is just as likely to be acquainted with the probability and extent
of it as the master." Cf. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377,
58 Sup. Ct. 184, 28 L. ed. 787 (1884).
6 Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Koske, 279 U. S. 7, 49 Sup. Ct 202, 73 L. ed.
578 (1929) ; Toledo, St. L. & W. R. R. v. Allen, 276 U. S. 165, 172, 48 Sup. Ct.
215, 217, 72 L. ed. 513 (1928) ; Seaboard Air Line v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492,
34 Sup. Ct. 635, 58 L. ed. 1062 (1914).
7 New York, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Boulden, 63 F. (2d) 917, certiorari denied,
289 U. S. 753, 53 Sup. Ct. 785, 77 L. ed. 1498 (1932) ; Gila Valley, G. & No.
Ry. v. Hall, 232 U. S. 94 (1914).
8 See Toledo, St. L. & W. R. R. v. Allen, 276 U. S. 165, 171, 172, 48 Sup.
Ct. 215, 217, 72 L. ed. 513 (1928) ; Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Aeby, 275 U. S. 426,
430, 48 Sup. Ct. 177, 179, 72 L. ed. 351 (1928). See also 35 AM. Jun. 719 and
3 LABATT, MASTER AND SERVANT (2d ed.) pars. 1164-1172, 1205, 1210.
9 Kansas City So. Ry. v. Williford, 65 F. (2d) 223, certiorari denied, 290
U. S. 666, 54 Sup. Ct. 87, 78 L. ed. 576 (1933) ; Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v.
Koske, 279 U. S. 7, 49 Sup. Ct. 202, 73 L. ed. 578 (1929) ; cf. Jacob v. City of
New York, 315 U. S. 752, 757, 62 Sup. Ct. 854, 856, 86 L. ed. 1166 (1942);
Jones v. East Tennessee etc. R. R., 128 U. S. 443, 9 Sup. Ct. 118, 32 L. ed. 478
(1888).
10 34 STAT. 232, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. (1906) (declared unconstitutional
as to intrastate commerce aspect in First Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U. S.
463 [1908] and repassed in conformity with constitutional requirements of the
decision, 35 STAT. 65, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. [1908]).
11 Adams v. Chicago & E. R. R., 314 Ill. App. 404, 41 N. E. (2d) 991
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for the strict rule of contributory negligence ;12 survivor's actions for
tort liability were allowed.' 3 Prior to the 1939 amendment one in-
road was made upon the "assumption of risks' doctrine, to wit, that it
shall constitute no defense to a carrier in cases where there was a
violation by the carrier of a safety statute.14  This latter provision in
the Act was inferentially interpreted in Seaboard Air Line v. Hor-
ton 15 to leave the defense intact in other situations as a common law
bar to recovery, on the theory of implied contract, or volenti non fit
injuria.16 The construction of the 1939 amendment by the Supreme
Court in the instant case eliminated completely "assumption of risk"
as a defense by employers against the consequence of their own negli-
gence. By applying the universally accepted test of negligence, "lack
of due care under the circumstances", and fixing the standard of care
as "commensurate to the dangers of the business", the Court in effect
reverted from a question of law, to a jury question, the issue of
whether assumption by an employee of the dangers of the business
left the employer in a position of non-negligence.
Congress has not yet seen fit to abandon entirely the concept of
negligence in favor of a system of workmen's compensation 17 as a
remedy for employees of interstate railroad carriers who are victims
of industrial accidents. Congress undoubtedly is aware of the social
desirability and economic justice in insuring an employee against haz-
ards of occupation over which he has little or no control.' 8 However,
the gradual alleviation from the Act of some of the harsh doctrines
of the common law of negligence evinces at least a recognition of the
(1942) ; Chesapeake etc. R R. vP. Atley, 241 U. S. 310, 60 L. ed. 1016 (1916)
(rule abrogated by construction).
22 45 U. S. C. § 53 provides in part: "... the fact that the employee may
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the
damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to such employee.'
1345 U. S. C. §59 (1910).
14 Id. § 54 (still part of § 54 after amendment-cited supra note 4): ..
and no employee shall be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in
any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for
the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee."
15 233 U. S. 492, 502, 34 Sup. Ct. 635, 640, 58 L. ed. 1062, L. L A. 1915C
(1914) ; accord, Great Northern Ry. v. Leonidas, 305 U. S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 51,
83 L. ed. 3 (1915).
16 For attack on doctrine, see Buford, Assumptiom of Risk Under Federal
Employer's Liability Act (1914) 28 HARv. L. Rav. 163; Note (1939) 53 HARv.
L. REv. 341.
27 Forty-seven states of the Union have enacted workmen's compensation
laws, leaving only Mississippi with no legislation on this subject. Territorial
acts have established workmen's compensation in Alaska, Hawaii, Philippine
Islands, and Puerto Rico. The Federal Congress has enacted a law covering
the District of Columbia, and Federal Acts have also been made applicable to
all United States civil employees and to longshoremen and harbor workers.
U. S. HANDBOOK OF LA oR STATISTICS (1941 ed.) Bulletin No. 694. See BoyD,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE UNDER MODERN CON-
DITIONs (1913); DOWNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1924).
18Ibid. (witness employments within the scope of federal power that have
been sheltered by workmen's compensation laws).
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now well-settled distinction between duties of care and .protection 19
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and the usual
duties of care flowing between individuals not so related. 20
B. B. L.
UNIFORm TRUST RECEIPT ACT-SECURITY INTEREST-LIERTY
OF SALE-BUYER IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BusINESS.-On
March 5, 1940, Carl Florio borrowed $2,500 from plaintiff, giving
therefor his promissory note, secured by a trust receipt. By the
terms of the receipt, Florio agreed to hold two trucks just received
from the manufacturer in trust for the plaintiff. Florio was to have
the privilege of exhibiting the trucks and could sell them only with
the written consent of the plaintiff. If they were sold, he was to hold
the proceeds of the sale for the plaintiff. Three days later, Florio
sold the trucks to Louis Neveloff, who was unaware of the existence
of the trust receipt, pursuant to a conditional sales contract which
provided that title should remain in the seller, named as Carl Florio
in the conditional sales agreement, until the agreed price was paid,
and that the seller could repossess the trucks upon default in pay-
ments, or if they were attached by creditors. Within the next two
weeks, the conditional sales contract was assigned for new value to
the plaintiff, and duly filed. The purchaser defaulted in making pay-
ments under the conditional sales contract, but before plaintiff could
repossess the trucks, they were attached by defendants, who are a
deputy sheriff and creditors of the conditional vendee. This action is
brought to replevin the trucks, and is resisted on the ground that the
conditional sales contract is invalid as against the defendants because
it failed to comply with a statute requiring all the conditions of a
conditional sales agreement to be incorporated in the filed contract.'
It is claimed that the filed contract is defective in that it failed to men-
tion the trust receipt transaction, and falsely described Florio as the
seller and holder of title, whereas in truth he had no authority to sell,
and title was in the entruster, by virtue of the trust receipt. Held,
the conditional sales contract was validly filed as against defendants;
failure to mention the trust receipt was not material and its descrip-
tion of the vendor as the seller and holder of title was accurate, since
1 9 See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New York Cent. R. R. v. Win-field, 244 U. S. 147, 165 (1917).
2 0 See Schoene and Watson, Workmen's Compensation on Interstate Rail-
ways (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 389; Richbeig, Advantages of a Federal Com-
pensation Act for Railway Employees (1931) 21 Am. LA.. LEG. Rev. 401.
1 CoNN. GEN. STATUTES OF 1930, § 4697 in substance requires that a condi-
tional bill of sale must be recorded to protect the vendor against innocent pur-
chasers from the conditional vendee, and further provides that it must set forth
"all conditions of such sale."
[ VOL. 17
